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The Need for Precursor 
• CAIB Final Report (October 2003) 
- Section 7. 1: "Signals of potential danger, anomalies, and critical information should, in 
principle, surface in the hazard identification process and be tracked with risk 
assessments supported by engineering analyses." 
• 2006 ASAP Annual Report in regards to Safety Management 
- "the ASAP found that ... the Agency, could better gauge the likelihood of losses by 
developing leading indicators, rather than continuing to depend on lagging indicators." 
• NPR 8715.3C, "NASA General Safety Program Requirements" (March 2008) 
- 2.5.2.2 System engineers shall: 
» d. Ensure that the system safety models are developed in an iterative process to allow model expansion, model 
updating, and model integration as the design evolves and operational experience is acquired (Requirement). 
» Note: Relevant leading-indicator (or precursor) events should be documented and evaluated for their impact on 
the system safety analyses assumptions. Trending of these precursor events should be conducted and 
contrasted to applicable PMs. 
- 2.5.4. 1 Project managers shall ensure that the performance attributes and precursors 
that are identified as being important indicators of system safety are monitored 
(Requirement). 
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Background 
• Definition of a "precursor" 
- An indication of a problem with the potential to recur 
with more severe consequences 
• Key Attributes: 
- Observation (IF I, PRACA) indicates some 
"failure mechanism" 
- Same mechanism could occur again 
- The consequences could be more severe than what 
has been experienced 
• Columbia accident was 
actually preceded by a 
direct accident precursor, 
STS-4S. Post flight 
inspection of the right 
Reinforced Carbon-
Carbon leading edge 
found two gouges. 
• Corrective Action Taken: 
Panel Replaced 
- This solved the 
immediate condition, but 
did not eliminate the 
mechanism for more dire 
consequences 
Background 
Operational Definition of Precursor 
• 
• Historically, precursor analysis has been focused on failures, 
e.g., at Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
• NASA process extends focus to anomalies 
- NASA's databases contain mostly anomalies 
(a defect, fault, or other deviation) 
- NASA has a stronger incentive to prevent any failure due 
to fewer barriers in its space systems 
• Operational definition of precursors: 
Anomalies that upon evaluation are determined to indicate a 
failure mechanism that may pose a significant degree of risk 
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Background 
• 
• Examples of Precursors 
- A near-miss because of chance or an opportune mitigation 
- Faults that without correction can lead to severe outcomes 
- Unexpected trend in test or operational data 
- Reduced repair/maintenance effectiveness 
- Unexpected effects from aging of equipment 
- Common causes of faults or deteriorations 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!I!!!!!!! ...... !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! __ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!''''''''''' Page No.7 

r ..... 
Systems / 
Operational 
Practices 
co 
c: 
o 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
~Ol .~ c: 
c: .-
ClI E 
OlCll 
.... Q) 
0-,1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Shuttle 
ISS 
Robotic Missions 
Ground Facilities 
! 
Operational Off-
Nominal Data 
In-flight Anomalies 
Non-conformance cases 
Failures 
Faults 
Others 
Collection and Analysis of 
Operational Data (e.g. failure, 
faults) Supports Development of 
I Models, including identificatio 
of hazards 
~--------
Actual 
Performance 
--
Predicted 
Performance 
Management Decisions 
and Actions 
Safety and 
Performance Model 
Hazard Analysis / Reports 
Engineering Analysis 
Risk / Reliability Models / 
PRA / and others 
1 
Risk-Informed 
Safety Case 
Performance Allocation 
Implied Resource Allocation 
Performance Commitments 
Processes 
Input to Risk Management 
Risk Information 
Input 
What is Precursor Analysis? 
• Precursor Analysis 
- Screens observed anomalies for need to perform evaluation 
- Evaluates and dispositions events into three catagories 
- Performs detailed analysis of selected anomalies 
• Makes risk analysis more experience-based 
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Pilot Precursor Summaries 
• 
• Objective 
- Exercise the Accident Precursor Analysis (APA) Process developed for 
the ISS 
• Two Pilot sessions were held in 2010 
• March 2010 - the Electrical Power System (EPS) 
• August 2010 - Communications and Tracking (C& T) along with 
Command and Data Handling (C&DH) 
- 1.5 days dedicated to anomaly review and generalization 
- 1.5 days dedicated to grading of anomalous conditions 
- Constrained focus of session to the respective system anomalies and did 
not investigate across all ISS systems 
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• 
• 
Anomaly Review Results 
• 
A caseload of 40 EPS non-conformance records was produced for the 
working session and al/ records were reviewed 
Many records, however, were screened out from further APA evaluation 
Anomaly Fully 
Reviewed 
• Redundant Anomalous 
Condition 
• Discovered During 
Acceptance Testing 
Ii Not An Anomaly 
o Insufficient Information 
eto continue APA 
evaluation 
-Records pursued for 
APA evaluation 
-Screened out from 
further APA evaluation 
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• 
.... 
Generalization Results 
• 
Of the 28 Anomalies which were fully reviewed, 15 Generalized Potential 
Failures (GPFs) were created 
- Total of 33 anomalous conditions (both observed and postulated) 
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Obs@rved Anomaly 
Ungrounded Connectors on Jumper W3301 PI , 
Jumpers were designed without a grounded 
backshell; original cables needed grounded 
backshell. Design flaw exists in some IVA and 
EVA cases. 
-Anomaly 
Review & 
Generalization 
Observed Anomaly 
Failure Condition of Concern: possibility 
for electric shock to a crew member 
(>32V. 3A) during nominal activities 
Not recommended for further 
evaluation 
-Evaluation & Grading 
-Recommended 
.Eai!!Im Component Type 
Mechanism 
Design Flaw 
Jumper Cables with 
Ungrounded Backshell 
Failure Condition of Concern: possibility 
for electric shock to a crew member 
(>32V, 3A) during IVA maintenance 
Recommended for further 
evaluation 
Failure Condition Index 
Failure Condition of Concern: possibility 
for molten metal generation to occur 
during EVA 
Recommended for further 
evaluation 
Failure Condition Index 
Graded unexpected that a 
ungrounded jumper cable CQuid 
cause electric shock to a crew 
member during IVA maintenance 
Graded unlikely that a ungrounded 
jumper cable could cause molten 
metal generation during EVA 
Conditional Consequence Index 
Graded probable that electric 
shock to crew could cause loss of 
crew 
Conditional Consequence Index 
Graded probable that generation 
of monen metal on EVA could 
cause loss of crew 
None Risk Modeling Further Action Observation & Trending 
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Grading Results (cont) 
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Results Summary 
process completed for 40 anomalies over -3 days 
-40 ~ olnsufficient information/Acceptance Test/Non-Anomaly Records 
oAnD;"'''O c:v. • X 
-28 
Evaluated 
-Generalizatio 
n 
-Of those 40 records, 28 anomalies were not screened from 
further evaluation 
-28 ~ 
Anomalies I V 
-15 
-Grade 
-Gradin 
9 
-15 GPFs created from 28 anomalies 
-15 recommended for grading 
-3 recommended for Risk Modeling 
-3 I -3 recommended for Observation & Trending 
-9 deemed low risk requiring no further analysis 
-3 I -3 had consequences outside of the evaluated 
system and the expertise of the se~J~PNO. 16 
Results of Screening Criteria 
• 1 screen identified 
- Screen out records recorded during acceptance testing 
- Requires search in the "detected during field" for "acceptance" or 
"ATP" 
- Only applies to PRACA reports 
• Other areas for potential screens did not return results 
- Both "open" and "closed" records had sufficient information to 
complete generalization 
- The type of report (IFI or PRACA) did not reflect any non-
applicability to the APA process 
- Records recorded both "on-orbit" as well as at NASA or contractor 
facilities were found sufficient to generate GPFs 
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Summary & Conclusion (cont.) 
• Successfully demonstrated that Precursor Analysis is 
implementable on the ISS 
• Both PRACA and IFI records were evaluated, and both provided 
valid risk information to support the process 
• ISS experts noted that the Precursor exercise gave them a 
different perspective on the anomalies reviewed 
Future Work 
• Future Work 
- Have made the Precursor Analysis part of the Fiscal Year 2011 
baseline work plan 
• 
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• 
Back-up 
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How do we focus 0 risk-significant anomalies? 
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